ABSTRACT Certificateless signature (CLS) has no need of public key certificates and also avoids excessive dependence to a third party like that in identity-based setting. Recently, Shim (IEEE Systems Journal, doi:10.1109/JSYST.2018.2844809) came up with a CLS scheme independent of random oracles and asserted that the construction can be immune to the public key replacement attacks and the malicious-but-passive key generation center (KGC) attacks. In this paper, we analyze the security of Shim's scheme and point out that his conclusions are incorrect by giving two concrete counter-examples. We repair the scheme and put forward a CLS scheme secure against public key replacement attacks and malicious-but-passive KGC attacks without relying on random oracles. Compared with Shim's scheme, our construction has lower execution cost for signing and verification, and achieves Girault's top-level security, which means that a victim can repudiate the forgeries based on a false secret key generated by the KGC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures can assure the validity, completeness, and non-repudiation of data resources and have drawn a lot of interest since their introduction. In deployment, however, Certification Authority (CA) needs to be deployed to guarantee the relationship between a verification key and its holder, and any verifier needs to check the verification key validity before trusting a digital signature, which is tedious, time consuming, and inefficient.
In 1984, Shamir [1] conceived the identity-based cryptography (IBC). In such a scenario, the acknowledged entity identity is directly considered as its public key and the corresponding private key can be derived from the identity by a private key generator (PKG). Here, the cumbersome certification like that from CA has been avoided. For another, PKG can impersonate any entity owning to know all entities private key. Obviously, key escrow is inevitably brought into IBC.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] put forth a primitive of certificateless signature (CLS) to overcome these weaknesses in the previous cryptosystems. In CLS, each entity not only
The associate editor coordinating the review of this article and approving it for publication was Zhitao Guan. independently chooses his/her secret value but also requests a partial private key from a key generation center (KGC) to initialize the full secret key for themselves. Clearly, the secret value and the partial private key make up of the entity full secret signing key, which are generated by two independent parties. Only holding one of the above two parts cannot affect system security. In other words, neither KGC who just knows a target entity partial private key nor any interested party who just updates an uncertified target entity public key can generate a valid signature for the target entity. However, most previous studies depend on random oracle model (ROM) [3] . Unfortunately, when using concrete hash functions substitutes ideal ROMs, these studies are no longer guaranteed security in realty. The CLS schemes without ROM are more attractive.
In [4] , Shim presented an efficient CLS scheme and declared that its security can be ensured without depending on random oracles. Nevertheless, in this paper, we find that Shim's scheme cannot resist these attacks launched by the public key replacement attacker and the malicious-butpassive KGC, and gave two concrete attacks to illustrate that the security argument showed in [4] fails. We also put forth an efficient construction and prove its security against public key replacement attacks and malicious-but-passive KGC attacks without using random oracles. Compared with Shim's scheme, our construction has lower execution cost for signing and verification, and achieves Girault's top-level security, which means that a victim is able to repudiate the forgeries based on a false key pair produced by KGC. Note that, the details of Girault's security level is concisely reviewed in Subsection II-B.
A. RELATED WORK
Certificateless signature (CLS) [2] was first introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson in Asiacrypt'03. Here, the key generation center (KGC) only produces a user's partial private key, and each user picks an additional secret value for themselves independently. Obviously, the certificates management and key escrow problems in traditional public key system and identity-based system respectively are overcame in CLS. Unfortunately, Huang et al. [5] indicated that the concrete scheme given in [2] cannot resist the public key replacement attack. Meanwhile, they formally defined the security model of CLS and proposed an improvement. Later, a lot of useful schemes [6] - [18] were introduced to optimize performance. Nevertheless, most early studies were only proven secure in random oracle model, and some did not even provide rigorous proofs, whose security has no theoretical foundation.
In 2007, Liu et al. [19] raised the first CLS scheme provably secure in the standard model (without ROM). Nevertheless, Xiong et al. [9] pointed out that Liu et al.'s scheme cannot withstand the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks and gave a new construction. The next year, Yuan et al. [20] introduced another CLS scheme and claimed that it can be proven secure in the standard model. Unfortunately, two concrete public key replacement attacks on both of them [9] , [20] were illustrated by Xia et al. [21] . Later, Yu et al. [22] proposed an improved CLS scheme with higher computational efficiency and shorter system parameters without ROM. In 2014, Yuan and Wang [23] illustrate that Yu et al.'s CLS scheme is still subjected to the attacks from public key replacement adversaries and malicious-but-passive KGC, and then gave a resultful modification. In 2015, Pang et al. [24] constructed a new CLS scheme and asserted that the new scheme can reach Girault's trust level 3 in the standard model. In 2017, Wang and Xu [25] showed that [24] still cannot resist the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks and proposed a new construction in the standard model. In [25] , the signature size is related to the output length of hush functions, which is not very practical. After that, a strongly unforgeable CLS scheme was given in [26] but it can meet Girault's trust level 3. In [27] , Tseng et al. made a summary for the existing typical CLS schemes [9] - [12] , [14] , [15] , [22] , [23] , [25] , [26] , [28] , [29] and introduced a top-level secure CLS scheme with the current optimal performance in the standard model. Almost at the same time, Shim [4] gave a more efficient CLS scheme without using random oracles. Unfortunately, we will demonstrate that Shim's CLS scheme is still vulnerable to the key replacement attacks and the malicious-but-passive KGC attacks.
The paper has the following organization. Some preliminaries are given in Section II. Then, Section III shows a cryptanalysis on Shim's security argument. Next, our CLS construction and its security proof are introduced in Section IV. In Section V, we make a comparison with Shim's scheme. The overview is provided in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR GROUPS AND DIFFICULTY ASSUMPTIONS
Bilinear groups The bilinear map is defined asê :
where G 1 and G 2 denote two q-order multiplicative cyclic groups. It has the following features:
xy , where ∀u 1 , u 2 ∈ G 1 and ∀x, y ∈ Z * p ; •Non-degenracy:ê(g, g) = 1 G 2 , where g and 1 G 2 denote the generator of G 1 and the identity element of G 2 , respectively;
•Computability: Calculatingê(v 1 , v 2 ) is feasible in polynomial time, where v 1 , v 2 are chosen randomly from G 1 .
Throughout this paper, (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g) denotes an instance above, which has the same definition in [5] , [27] .
Discrete Logarithm (DL) Assumption In consideration of G 1 , g, g , no polynomial time algorithm can find the integer θ from Z * p such that g = g θ . Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Assumption Based on G 1 , g, g µ , g ν , no polynomial time algorithm can find the group element h such that h = g µν .
Collision Resistant Hash (CRH) Assumption Taking as input a hashing H k : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n , no polynomial time algorithm can find two random values m 1 
B. KGC'S SECURITY LEVEL
In [30] , Girault divided the trust hierarchy to an authoritative third party into three levels. The higher the level, the lesser dependent users become on the third party. Similarly, there are also three trust hierarchies to the KGC in certificateless signatures, which are shortly revisited as follows.
• Level 1: KGC is able to obtain any legitimate entity secret key. Namely, the KGC can sign any message picked by himself/herself instead of any entity.
• Level 2: KGC can provide a false secret key for any valid entity and the victim is not able to repudiate the forging process.
• Level 3: KGC cannot replace any legitimate entity secret key with a false secret key on condition that the replacement is not noticed by the victim. A CLS scheme achieving Level-3 security means that the KGC in the scheme does not impersonate any user by generating his/her false secret key without being detected by the victim. More specifically, the KGC cannot provide the same partial private key for different public keys. VOLUME 7, 2019 
C. OUTLINE OF CLS AND ITS SECURITY MODEL
The following five polynomial algorithms compose the generic construction of certificateless signature:
• Setup. Inputting a security parameters 1 λ , the KGC executes this algorithm and sets the master secret key msk and the corresponding public parameters pp.
• UserKeyGenerating. Inputting pp, a user with an identity ID runs this algorithm and sets the secret value e ID and the corresponding public key pk ID . Note that, e ID is kept secret for all, including KGC.
• PartialPrivateKeyExtracting. • Signing. Inputting pp, ID, pk ID , sk ID and a message m, the user runs this algorithm and sets a signature σ for himself/herself.
• Verifying. Inputting pp, ID, pk ID , m and σ , a verifier runs this algorithm and returns either ''TRUE'' or ''FALSE'' in terms of the validity of σ . Here, we also take into account three categories of attackers like in [27] . The first category denotes a public key replacement attacker (A 1 , for short) and requires that the attacker cannot know a victim partial private key but can independently update the victim secret value. The second category denotes a malicious-but-passive KGC (A 2 , for short) and requires that the attacker cannot obtain the secret value picked by a victim himself/herself but can adaptively initialize the system parameters. The third category denotes the Level 3 attacker (A 3 , for short) defined in the subsection above. Next, in order to capture all of them, we formalize the following three simulation games between a challenger C and A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , respectively.
Game 1 (for the first category A 1 )
• Init: Inputting a security parameter 1 λ , the challenger C simulates Setup to initialize the public parameters pp and the master secret key msk. Note that the attacker A 1 just eventually obtains pp.
• Queries: During this period, the attacker A 1 can adaptively launch some queries as follows: • Setup: The attacker A 2 adaptively simulates the system parameters (pp, msk) and sends them to the challenger C.
Here, the distribution of the above parameters is indistinguishable from that of real system parameters.
• Queries: 
m). Definition 1 (Existential Unforgeability):
Certificateless signature satisfies existential unforgeability (EUF) if any efficient attacker is unable to break the above two simulation games in a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT).
Game 3 (for the third category A 3 )
• Setup: The attacker A 3 adaptively simulates the system parameters (pp, msk) and sends them to the challenger C. Here, the distribution of the above parameters is indistinguishable from that of real system parameters.
III. ANALYSIS OF SHIM'S SCHEME A. REVIEW ON SHIM'S CONSTRUCTION
Here, the five algorithms of Shim's scheme [4] are concisely revisited as follows:
• Setup. On the basis of (q, 
e, Z ) as the public parameters and keeps msk = g α 2 private.
• UserKeyGenerating (UKG). Inputting an identity ID, the user: -chooses randomly τ, x ∈ Z * p and sets
as the identity secret value.
-computes and sets
as the identity public key.
• PartialPrivateKeyExtracting (PPKE). Inputting an identity ID, KGC: 
where 
where
• Verifying. Given pp, pk ID , m, σ , a verifier: • chooses randomly r d , r e ∈ Z * p and calculates
• outputs σ as the forged signature on m * under pk ID * . Obviously, the forgery σ is sound on m * under ID * with pk ID * sincê e(σ 1 , pk 1 ) =ê(g
=ê(g
where Z =ê(g 1 , g 2 ).
2) MALICIOUS-BUT-PASSIVE KGC ATTACKS
Here, we will illustrate that the KGC without knowing the user secret value v ID can impersonate any user ID to give a valid forgery σ on any message m under ID with pk ID . The details are as follows. VOLUME 7, 2019 Stage 1. On the basis of (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g), the KGC initializes the systems as follows:
• chooses randomly α, β, γ , x , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n d , y , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n e from Z * p and sets
• selects two concrete cryptographic hashing H d : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n d , and H e : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n e , where n d and n e are fixed lengths.
• opens pp = (G 1 , G 2 , g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , d , d, e , e, Z , H d , H e ) as the public parameters and keeps these trapdoors (α, β, γ , x , x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n d , y , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n e ) secret. Note that it is impossible for any PPT third party to detect the above trapdoors embedded in the public parameters provided by the KGC due to the DL assumption.
Stage 2. Taking as input pp, the entity with the identity ID performs the UKG algorithm to set the identity secret value v ID = (τ, x) (∈ R Z p ) and the corresponding public key as pk ID = (pk 1 , pk 2 ) = (g τ , g x ). Here, v ID is kept a secret from the KGC.
Stage 3. Given pp, pk ID , m and σ , the KGC:
, ID, pk ID ).
•
sets D = {i|d[i] = 1} and E = {i|e[i] = 1}, where d[i] and e[i] stand for the ith bit of d and e, respectively.
• lets D = d i∈D d i = g a , E = e i∈E e i = g b , where a = x i∈D x i , b = y i∈E y i • chooses randomly r d , r e ∈ Z * p and calculates σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) • outputs σ as her/his forged signature on m under pk ID . Obviously, the forgery σ given by KGC is sound on the message m under the target identity ID with pk ID = (pk 1 , pk 2 ) since
=ê(σ 1 , pk 1 ).
IV. OUR CLS SCHEME
Here, we come up with a CLS scheme which can stop KGC forging a false key pair for a target user without being detected by the victim, and reduce its security to two classic signature schemes [31] , [32] , and cryptographic hashing in the standard model.
A. BUILDING BLOCKS
Now, we take a brief look at the classical signature schemes [31] , [32] to make our concrete construction and its security proofs more clear.
Waters' Digital Signature (WDS) [31]
• SetUKey. Given an instance (q, , G 2 ,ê, g, h 1 , h 2 , w , w) public.
• Signing. Inputting a message m and pk ID , the user:
-picks randomly r m from Z * p and calculates w = H w (pk ID m).
w[i] stands for the ith bit of w. -generates a signature as follows:
where W = w i∈W w i .
• Verifying. Inputting pk ID , m and σ , a verifier: [32] • Setup. On the basis of (q, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, g), KGC:
-picks randomly α from Z * p and calculates g 1 = g α . -chooses random elements g 2 , u , v from G 1 and
i=1 of length n u and n m , respectively. Note that, all values are randomly chosen from G 1 . -selects two cryptographic hashing H u : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n u , and H v : G 1 → {0, 1} n m , where n u and n m are fixed lengths. -needs to respectively make msk = g α 2 private and pp
• Extracting. Inputting an identity ID, KGC:
-calculates u = H u (ID) and sets U = {i|u[i] = 1}, where u[i] stands for the ith bit of u. -picks r u ∈ R Z * p and computes
where U = u i∈U u i . -sends the secret key sk ID to the user ID securely.
• Signing. Inputting pp, ID, a message m, the user:
-parses sk ID as (sk 1 , sk 2 ) and calculates v = H v (ID pp m sk 2 ). 
where U = u i∈U u i , V = v i∈V v i .
• 
where U = u i∈U u i , V = v i∈V v i . -outputs ''TRUE'' if the above formula holds; otherwise, outputs ''FALSE''.
B. OUR CONCRETE SCHEME
Here, our CLS scheme is formalized as follows.
. . , x n u , y , y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n m ) private.
• UserKeyGenerating (UKG). Taking as input an identity ID, a user:
and sets the identity secret value e ID = (β 1 , β 2 , z ,
and sets the corresponding public key as pk ID = (h 1 , h 2 , w , w).
• PartialPrivateKeyExtracting (PPKE). Inputting pk ID and ID, KGC: 
where U = u i∈U u i .
-transmits securely the partial private key d ID to the user ID. In fact, sk ID = (d ID , e ID ) stands for the user full secret key.
• Signing. Inputting pp, ID, pk ID and a message m, the user: 
where V = v i∈V v i and W = w i∈W w i .
• Verifying. Inputting pp, ID, pk ID , m and σ , a verifier: 
where U = u i∈U u i , V = v i∈V v i and W = w i∈W w i . -outputs ''TRUE'' if the above formula holds; otherwise, outputs ''FALSE''. Correctness of the scheme We set U , V , W in the same methods as above and have that
In reality, we can concisely set msk = α 1 and e ID = β 1 because the others are not used during the execution of the proposed CLS scheme. Here, all of them are explicitly listed to implement the following argument easily.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We present the three lemmas to argue the above construction security without relying on random oracles.
Lemma 1: If PIBS is existential unforgeable, the proposed scheme is existential unforgeable against public key replacement attacker A 1 .
Proof: If a PPT attacker A 1 can penetrate our CLS scheme, then a PPT attacker B 1 who can break the PIBS VOLUME 7, 2019 scheme can be simulated with a non-negligible probability. In addition, the attacker B 1 will maintain a list T to record those interaction information with the attacker A 1 in the whole process.
Init. The attacker
w ) from PIBS to initialize the system and returns it to the attacker A 1 as the system parameters. Note that H u , H v , H w denote secure hash functions, where H w is separately picked by the attacker B 1 .
Queries. At this stage, the attacker A 1 can adaptively do some queries and the attacker B 1 responds them as follows:
• O ppk (ID, pk ID ): The attacker B 1 invokes the algorithm PIBS.Extracting to derive the partial private key d ID related to the item (ID, pk ID ) for the attacker A 1 .
• O sv (ID): The attacker B 1 searches the secret value e ID = (β 1 , β 2 , z , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n m ) related to the item ID from the list T . If the search fails, the attacker B 1 first picks (β 1 , β 2 , z , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n m ) ∈ Z * p and stores these values as the corresponding secret value in the list T . At last, the attacker B 1 returns e ID to the attacker A 1 .
• O pk (ID): The attacker B 1 retrieves the public key pk ID = (h 1 , h 2 , w , w 1 , . . . , w n m ) related to ID from the list T . If the retrieval fails, the attacker B 1 first picks (
At last, the attacker B 1 returns pk ID to the attacker A 1 .
• O rep (ID, pk ID ): The attacker B 1 updates the public key pk ID related to the identity ID with the new value pk ID provided by the attacker A 1 in the list T . If these item related to the identity ID has not been established, the attacker B 1 directly sets the user public key to be pk ID .
• O sign (ID, pk ID , m): The attacker B 1 first retrieves the list T to obtain the secret value e ID = (β 1 , β 2 , z , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n m ) related to the identity ID. Then, the attacker B 2 requests the underlying algorithm PIBS.Signing to obtain a temporary tuple (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) on the requested message m under the designated identity pk ID ID. Next, the attacker B 1 calculates w = H w (pk ID ID pp m σ 2 ) and sets
. . , n m }. At last, the attacker B 2 sets σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) and returns it to A 2 as the signature on m under ID with pk ID .
Forgery.
If the attacker A 1 takes m * , ID * , pk ID * as input and eventually returns a valid signature σ * = (σ * 1 , σ * 2 , σ * 3 ), then the attacker B 1 is surely able to break the PIBS scheme by giving a valid forgeryσ on m * under the designated identity pk ID * ID * as follows:
. . , n m }, where w * [i] stands for the ith bit of w * .
• setsσ 1 
Obviously, the above result is incompatible with that PIBS is existential unforgeable [32] . Therefore, the construction is existential unforgeable against the attacks from the public key replacement adversary.
Lemma 2: If the WDS scheme is existential unforgeable, our CLS scheme is existential unforgeable against maliciousbut-passive KGC A 2 .
Proof: If a PPT attacker A 2 can penetrate our CLS scheme, then a PPT attacker B 2 who can break the WDS scheme can be simulated with a non-negligible probability. In addition, the attacker B 2 will maintain a list T to record those interaction information with the attacker A 2 in the whole process.
Init. The attacker A 2 adaptively sets the system parameters (msk, pp) and transmits them to the challenger C. Note that,
Queries. At this stage, the attacker A 2 can adaptively do some queries and the attacker B 2 responds them as follows:
• O sv (ID): The attacker B 2 searches the secret value e ID = (β 1 , β 2 , z , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n m ) related to the item ID from the list T . If the search fails, the attacker B 2 first picks (β 1 , β 2 , z , z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n m ) ∈ Z * p and stores these values as the corresponding secret value in the list T . At last, the attacker B 2 returns e ID to the attacker A 2 .
• O pk (ID): The attacker B 2 retrieves the public key pk ID = (h 1 , h 2 , w , w 1 , . . . , w n m ) related to ID from the list T . If the retrieval fails, the attacker B 2 first picks (
At last, the attacker B 2 returns pk ID to the attacker A 2 .
• O rep (ID, pk ID ): The attacker B 2 updates the public key pk ID related to the identity ID with the new value pk ID provided by the attacker A 2 in the list T . If these item related to the identity ID has not been established, the attacker B 2 directly sets the user public key to be pk ID .
• O sign (ID, pk ID , m): Inputting msk, the attacker B 2 first simulates the algorithm PPKE to obtain the partial private key • setsσ 1 
Obviously, the above result is incompatible with that WDS is existential unforgeable [31] . Therefore, the proposed scheme is existential unforgeable against the attacks from malicious-but-passive KGC.
Lemma 3: If H u is cryptographic hash function, our construction is able to withstand the Level 3 attacker A 3 .
Analysis: A 3 breaking our CLS scheme means that A 3 can give a valid key pair (pk ID * , sk ID * ) and the target user ID * has no evidence to deny this key pair. In other words, the target user holds the same partial private key corresponding to pk ID * and pk ID * . It implies H u (pk ID * ID * ) = H u (pk ID * ID * ). Obviously, it is incompatible with that H u is cryptographic hashing. Therefore, the proposed scheme can repudiate the Level 3 attacks.
It is obvious that our construction security can be guaranteed by the above three lemmas without relying on random oracles.
V. COMPARISON
In [27] , Tseng et al. made a comprehensive summary about the previous classical works [9] - [12] , [14] , [15] , [22] , [23] , [25] , [26] , [28] , [29] and gave a CLS scheme with the current whole optimum performance. Almost simultaneously, Shim also introduced an efficient CLS scheme. Here, we make a detailed comparison between our CLS scheme with the two typical ones [4] , [27] in security properties and efficiency.
By contrast, we find that [27] meets the property of Girault's level-3 security like ours but has longer signature length, and [4] has the same signature size with our CLS scheme but cannot withstand any attack launched by Type I, Type II and Level 3. In summary, our scheme not only overcomes the weaknesses in [4] , [27] , but also has efficient signing and verifying, shorter length of signature. More detailed comparisons between [4] , [27] and our scheme are illustrated in Table 1 and 2. Note that, the running time of the different operations from the PCB library are stable on a given platform. For example, an optimal-ate pairing operation takes 0.524 ms on Phenom II X4 940, 3.0 GHZ, which has been validated in [4] . Therefore, the numbers of each operation listed in Table 2 can reflect the execution cost of each scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, our analysis indicated that Shim's construction is not immune to the public key replacement adversaries and the malicious-but-passive KGC. To repair these weaknesses, we constructed a top-level CLS scheme and proved its security against the Type 1, Type 2 and Level 3 attacks without relying on ROM. The proposed scheme has shorter signature length, and lower computation and verification cost compared with Shim's scheme. 
